海事百科
Maritime Encyclopedia
1 Thoughts on the Oil Investment Cycle
關(guān)于原油投資周期的幾點(diǎn)思考
We are in the midst of the fourth major oil investment bust since 1900, and while this cycle is different in some critical ways (particularly the speed at which investment translates into output), the big picture process is the same as in previous cycles.
我們正處在自1900年以來第四個主要的原油投資熱潮的中期。然而這個周期對比其他周期來講，從不同的角度來看（尤其是在投資轉(zhuǎn)化為輸出的這個速率方面），宏觀上來說和前投資周期并無二致。
2
Commodity investment cycles tend to follow a broadly classic process:
大宗商品的投資周期往往傾向重復(fù)一套固定經(jīng)典的流程
1) In the first phase, a pickup in commodity-intensive growth causes a global surge in demand for commodities to outstrip supply. As demand pushes up against capacity limits, prices rise.
在第一個投資階段里，當(dāng)來自于大宗商品深度的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長出現(xiàn)好轉(zhuǎn)，就會導(dǎo)致一個全球?qū)Υ笞谏唐返男枨蟪霈F(xiàn)暴增并進(jìn)一步使得需求超越供應(yīng)。當(dāng)需求激增，最終超越需求限制時，大宗商品的價格上漲。
2) In the second phase, high prices caused by the supply and demand imbalance induce large amounts of capital expenditure. As prices rise, margins for commodity producers widen and profits increase. These producers, flush with cash and looking at high prices, invest in profitable opportunities to expand production. There is a massive investment boom. This acts as a support to growth and inflation as capital expenditure accelerates.
在第二個階段里，由供需之間的不平衡關(guān)系而引起的高價格將誘發(fā)大規(guī)模的資本開支。當(dāng)價格出現(xiàn)普漲，大宗商品的制造商們的生產(chǎn)的安全邊際更寬同時利潤也攀升。這些生產(chǎn)商們，手上持有著充沛的現(xiàn)金并且緊盯著更高的價格，同時尋找著更具利潤的機(jī)會去拓展他們的生產(chǎn)規(guī)模。而這導(dǎo)致的是一個更大規(guī)模的投資熱潮。這樣的現(xiàn)象同時將給予增長以及通脹一個強(qiáng)力支撐，這也伴隨著資本開支的加速上升。
3) The third phase is typically marked by a slowdown in commodity demand that occurs when the original growth that sparked the cycle fades and high prices incentivize reductions in demand growth, by encouraging substitution and efforts to improve efficiency. Simultaneously, the investment boom begins to bring new supply online, demand/supply imbalances ease, and prices stabilize. Thus, high prices help set in motion the increase in supply and reduction in demand that eventually lead to the turning of the cycle.
第三階段通常由一個大宗商品需求的放緩，緊接著就是先前由大宗周期帶來的激增逐漸減弱。高昂的大宗商品價格同時進(jìn)一步遏制了需求的增長。而市場對可替代的大宗商品的渴求以及使用這些可替代物的努力將增強(qiáng)這個系統(tǒng)的效率。與此同時，投資熱潮將進(jìn)一步帶來新的供應(yīng)生產(chǎn)線，需求/供應(yīng)之間的不平衡將逐漸減弱，價格逐漸平穩(wěn)。因此，高昂的大宗貨品價格將需求的增長和需求的減弱這樣的趨勢不斷加強(qiáng)，最終扭轉(zhuǎn)整個循環(huán)。
4) In the fourth phase, there is a supply glut. The balance between demand and supply swings sharply in the other direction, as production is much greater than demand. This phase is typically characterized by large price declines.
在第四個階段里，我們將看到供應(yīng)過剩。當(dāng)產(chǎn)量遠(yuǎn)大于需求時，供應(yīng)需求之間的平衡將往另一個方向劇烈地變化。這樣的階段也往往具有價格大量下跌的特性。
5) As prices fall, margins for commodity producers are squeezed. And, in the fifth phase, producers respond to low prices by slashing investment and in some cases shutting down production permanently. This decline in supply eventually brings the market back into balance, as the low investment deteriorates capacity, sowing the seeds for the next cycle.
當(dāng)大宗商品的價格跌落時，大宗商品生產(chǎn)商們的安全邊際被巨大地擠壓。同時在第五個階段里，生產(chǎn)商為了應(yīng)對大宗商品價格的低迷，將通過大量削減投資并且通過永久關(guān)閉部分生產(chǎn)線以應(yīng)對危機(jī)。供應(yīng)的大幅削減將最終迫使市場回歸平衡，而當(dāng)?shù)兔缘耐顿Y在效益上不斷惡化時，這又為下一輪商品的復(fù)蘇散播下了種子。
We are currently in stage 5 of the most recent cycle, where years of investment have left the market oversupplied and prices at the lowest level in a decade. The move in oil prices has resulted, as one would expect, in a collapse in investment that is no longer profitable. For most of 2016, there will likely continue to be a significant spot oil glut, as the lag between production and investment means that cuts will only gradually bite into production. However, unless prices rise significantly, supply will likely fall short of demand some time in 2017, leading to one of the most significant shortages in the history of the oil market soon thereafter. At this point, the forward price of oil does not appear high enough to create the needed investment, and the longer oil prices remain low, the larger the future gap between supply and demand is likely to be.
我們現(xiàn)在處在第五個階段，多年的在市場投資過剩而大宗商品的價格在這一階段處于最低水平。原油價格的走勢將導(dǎo)致，可以預(yù)期的是，那些不再盈利的投資將就此崩潰。在2016年的大部分時間里，非常可能我們會看到原油現(xiàn)貨的顯著過剩。生產(chǎn)和投資之間的滯差意味著生產(chǎn)的削減只會逐漸蠶食生產(chǎn)力。無論如何，除非價格顯著增長，在2017年的一段時間內(nèi)，供應(yīng)非常可能達(dá)不到需求的水平，這也將導(dǎo)致原油市場有史以來最顯著的短缺情形。在這個節(jié)點(diǎn)上，原油遠(yuǎn)期的價格并未高昂到足以提供足夠的投資資金。而原油價格在低位保持越長時間，供應(yīng)和需求之間的滯差就越可能在未來增加。
Before we dig into where we stand in the current oil investment cycle, it is worth offering some perspective on the major oil investment booms and busts over the last 100 years. The chart below shows the four major oil investment booms since 1900 and the price levels that spurred them. In the appendix, we describe each of these past booms. While the details of each cycle are different, the cause and effect linkages that drive them are the same.
在我們深入了解自身所處的石油投資周期之前，提供部分關(guān)于主要石油投資熱潮的觀點(diǎn)將是大有裨益的。尤其是過去100年里發(fā)生主要的原油投資熱潮以及泡沫破碎。上圖表現(xiàn)了自1900年以來四大主要的原油投資熱潮以及觸發(fā)這些熱潮的價格水平。在附錄里，我們將具體描述每一個過去的熱潮。然而每一個這樣的投資周期里，具體的細(xì)節(jié)都是不同的，然而其中的因果關(guān)系還有促使其形成的邏輯聯(lián)系都是相同的。
The current leg down in the commodity investment cycle (and accompanying decline in prices) has severely impacted the medium-term outlook for oil supply. While there is lots of uncertainty around exactly how long the market will remain out of balance, a particularly large reduction in supply could leave the market undersupplied as soon as 2017. In the near term, cuts in shale investment have and will continue to bite into production, and the supply issue is amplified going forward, as massive capex cuts from more traditional producers (with longer lag times between investment and production) flow through to supply. As described above, the supply glut phase of the cycle sows the seeds for a price rebound, which is necessary to allow supply to catch up with demand. Below, we walk through our picture of the current supply and demand dynamics in more depth.
現(xiàn)在大宗商品投資周期里的重挫（連同已經(jīng)重挫的大宗商品價格）開始劇烈沖擊中期里對石油供應(yīng)的前瞻。當(dāng)市場里的參與者對市場本身的供需失衡將會持續(xù)多久充滿著不確定性時，來自供應(yīng)端的銳減可能為市場帶來供應(yīng)不足的巨大問題。在近期來看（2016年）頁巖油投資額度的銳減將最終影響產(chǎn)能，供應(yīng)問題開始繼續(xù)放大，來自傳統(tǒng)生產(chǎn)商的巨大資本支出（在投資以及生產(chǎn)中伴隨著更高的滯差）最終流向供應(yīng)端。如上面所描述的，供應(yīng)過剩這一階段為價格反彈布下了種子，而這對于最終使得供應(yīng)得以跟上需求是必須的。下文中我們將深入闡述在我們的前瞻里，更深度的供應(yīng)和需求現(xiàn)狀變化。
3
Low Oil Prices Have Led to a Sharp Pullback in Investments
低油價使得投資額度銳減
At current spot and forward prices, most of the world’s investment opportunities are uneconomical. Consistent with this picture, over 20% of global oil capex was cut in 2015, and further cuts of at least 15% are likely this year. If prices remain low, we are likely to see capex collapse even further.
在現(xiàn)在的現(xiàn)貨和遠(yuǎn)期價格，世界上大部分的投資機(jī)會都缺乏經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。和這個場景一致的是，2015年里，超過20%的全球石油資本支出被削減，而今年（2016年）非常可能有近15%的削減，當(dāng)價格趨向于低迷，我們將看到資本支出進(jìn)一步崩潰。
US Shale Production Has Already Turned and Will Continue to Decline in the Coming Year.
美國頁巖油產(chǎn)量開始逆轉(zhuǎn)，這樣的產(chǎn)量還會繼續(xù)減少。
So far, US shale is the main source of oil supply where production has already turned, and production is likely to continue to decline over the next year. US shale production is much more responsive to prices than traditional sources of production—high decline rates mean that practically continuous reinvestment is required to maintain production levels. The time between initial investment and oil extraction is also significantly shorter for shale, meaning that capex cuts hit production faster in current (and future) cycles than has been the case historically. The dynamic nature of shale, combined with its relatively high cost of production, makes it particularly vulnerable in today’s price environment.
迄今為止，美國頁巖油是石油供應(yīng)的主要來源，其生產(chǎn)量增長趨勢出現(xiàn)反轉(zhuǎn)，產(chǎn)量將在明年持續(xù)減少。美國頁巖油遠(yuǎn)比傳統(tǒng)的生產(chǎn)反應(yīng)更為敏銳。居高不下的下降率意味著持續(xù)不斷的重復(fù)投資對維持當(dāng)前生產(chǎn)水平是極其必要的。而頁巖油的從初始投資到位到石油萃取這中間的耗時是更短的，這意味著資本支出在現(xiàn)在（以及未來）的周期里比歷史周期中更能重挫生產(chǎn)量。頁巖油的動態(tài)特性，結(jié)合了其相對來說高昂的生產(chǎn)成本來看，使得它在今日的價格環(huán)境里尤為脆弱
As a result, rig counts have plummeted to 2010 levels and production started to decline in the second half of last year, ahead of traditional counterparts. Declines in shale production thus far have actually been smaller than many expected, in large part because companies have managed to focus on only their most productive wells and to tighten their belts in typical cyclical ways (by firing employees, squeezing service providers, etc.). However, there are limits to how long companies can fight the tide of falling oil prices with this type of cost cutting. Additionally, because many of these cost-saving measures are tied to oil prices and associated activity levels, the positive impact of a price increase on shale production is somewhat muted by the fact that these costs would also increase.
結(jié)果是鉆機(jī)的數(shù)量大幅下滑至2010年的數(shù)量水平，生產(chǎn)力開始在第二年下半年開始減少，和傳統(tǒng)制造業(yè)者比較更甚。因此頁巖油產(chǎn)量的遞減程度較期望的少許多。在更大的方面來看由于這些公司成功地將他們的努力專注在他們所有的，生產(chǎn)力最強(qiáng)的鉆井并且將他們在這樣的周期里采取緊縮政策（通過解雇員工，將服務(wù)提供商的效益榨干等方式)。即便如此，當(dāng)石油價格驟降，公司抗擊通過采取上述這樣的成本控制方法抵抗負(fù)周期石油的能力是有極限的。進(jìn)一步說，因為有許多節(jié)流控制成本的方法和原油價格以及相關(guān)活動水平有極大的關(guān)系，即使在石油價格上漲時，這樣的正面影響也會被頁巖油上升的生產(chǎn)成本所抵消。
Outside of Shale, Production Has Not Yet Turned but Will Likely Decline Meaningfully in the Coming Years
在頁巖油以外，石油生產(chǎn)量仍未復(fù)蘇然而其將在不久的未來持續(xù)減少。
While investment has been cut across all sources of production, non-shale supply has not yet turned, as past investments continue to come online. Non-OPEC supply outside of the US is set to start declining gradually in the coming months, and we are likely to see a meaningful acceleration in supply declines beyond 2017, as the massive cutback in investment over the past year flows through. OPEC production has actually increased over the past year, as OPEC stepped away from its role as swing producer and chose instead to produce at nearly full capacity. The return of Iranian production following the lifting of nuclear sanctions is expected to provide a nearterm boost to production, but OPEC output is otherwise expected to remain flat at high levels over the next few years.
當(dāng)在石油的不同生產(chǎn)中投資規(guī)模都被削減時，非頁巖油的供應(yīng)仍未復(fù)蘇，即使在過去的投資持續(xù)到位時亦然。在美國市場以外的，非OPEC的供應(yīng)仍將在未來幾個月持續(xù)下滑，我們同時可能見到2017年隨著供應(yīng)減少而帶來的有意義的石油價格的攀升，而這是由于過去幾年來自投資的巨額撤回決定的。OPEC的生產(chǎn)量在過去幾年獲得持續(xù)的增長，當(dāng)OPEC不在生產(chǎn)調(diào)節(jié)者并且決定大開馬力生產(chǎn)時。伊朗核制裁的升級被市場預(yù)期為，短時間里來自原油價格的收益將攀升，然而OPEC 的產(chǎn)量數(shù)去卻被市場預(yù)期為，在未來幾年將維穩(wěn)在高位水平。
While Low Oil Prices Have Led to a Bleak Supply Outlook, Demand Is Expected to Grow at a Moderate Pace.
當(dāng)?shù)陀蛢r開始導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)前景黯淡，市場將預(yù)期需求以穩(wěn)定步伐增長。
Global oil demand will continue to grow at a moderate pace, driven entirely by the EM world, against a backdrop of modest global growth. While oil demand is driven primary by economic growth—which typically accounts for around three-quarters of the change—it is also affected by the oil price itself. Demand has received a boost from this cycle’s price decline, which will fade over the coming years.
全球石油需求將以穩(wěn)健的步伐增長，在全球適度增長的背景下，而這樣的增長率是由發(fā)展中世界帶來的。當(dāng)石油的需求首先被經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長所驅(qū)動，一般是以近三個季度的變化以計算，而這同時也受到油價自身的影響。需求將受到來自周期價格的衰退的強(qiáng)力支撐，而這樣的支撐力將在未來幾年減弱。
From a sector demand perspective, the transportation and petrochemical sectors are likely to account for the majority of demand growth. The transportation sector, which accounts for 55% of global oil demand, is likely to grow at a modestly slower pace in coming years, as pressure from rising fuel efficiency regulations (such as CAFE standards in the US) is somewhat offset by continued vehicle fleet growth in the EM world. Feedstock demand from the petrochemical sector is expected to be strong, as past investments in chemical plants come online to meet rising EM demand for plastics. Oil is also expected to continue to lose market share to renewables and other sources of energy in the power sector, though the impact will be fairly small as little oil is used for power generation at this point.
從不同板塊需求的角度來看，運(yùn)輸以及石油化工板塊貢獻(xiàn)了絕大部分需求的增長。而運(yùn)輸板塊，占了全球原油需求的55%，在未來幾年非常可能以一個緩慢而穩(wěn)健的速率增長。同時也受到了來自石油效率監(jiān)管的壓力（比如說美國的CAFE 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)）而這樣的壓力被新興市場中來自運(yùn)輸工具，船艦的增長所沖銷。石油化工板塊里的進(jìn)料需求被市場預(yù)計為強(qiáng)勁的。來自化工廠房的投資逐漸上線以滿足來自發(fā)展中市場對塑料的強(qiáng)勁需求。石油被認(rèn)為將在未來與來自其他能源領(lǐng)域的可替代品以及可再生能源的競爭中失去市場，然而這樣的沖擊將是非常小的，尤其是如今石油被廣泛利用在能源生產(chǎn)的應(yīng)用的情況下。
Below, we highlight some of the dynamics affecting transportation sector demand.
以下我們將重點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)一些會影響運(yùn)輸需求板塊的變量。
4
Rising Fuel Efficiency Standards Will Be a Drag
更嚴(yán)苛的燃料效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將成為石油價格的負(fù)擔(dān)
As environmental concerns mount, governments across the globe have made a big push to increase fuel efficiency, manifesting in lofty standards for carmakers and penalties for non-compliance. For example, US CAFE standards call for roughly 4% annual efficiency gains in new cars, twice the rate we’ve seen over the past decade. Other regions, such as China, the EU, and Korea, have set similarly aggressive targets, as shown below.
隨著來自環(huán)境的愈發(fā)關(guān)注，全球各個政府致力于推廣更嚴(yán)苛的燃料效率標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并且給例如汽車制造商這樣的廠商制定了傲慢的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，如果他們不遵守條約的話。舉個例子，美國CAFE標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求4%的年收益作為罰款。而這是過去標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的2倍。在其他地區(qū)，比如說中國，歐洲以及韓國，都設(shè)立了更具有侵略性的目標(biāo)，如下圖所示。
To illustrate the point, full adherence to CAFE standards in the US would result in a reduction of oil demand by about 0.5 mb/d by 2020. If other countries follow a similar pattern, the impact has the potential to be meaningful for global demand. That said, it’s hard to know to what extent companies will actually adhere to standards if consumer preferences are at odds with policy objectives. The chart on the left below lends some historical perspective to the case at hand. Past increases in fuel efficiency have been accompanied by large increases in oil prices—in this instance, standards are competing with low fuel prices. In addition, current CAFE standards call for more sustained and faster improvement than we’ve seen at any point over the past 35 years. The stated regulations appear to be a high target (and could change in upcoming reviews if the goal winds up being too lofty).
為了更好地說明我們要講的觀點(diǎn)，完全遵守美國設(shè)定的CAFE的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將會減少原油50萬桶/日的需求。如果其他的國家遵從相似的規(guī)律，這樣的沖擊將對全球需求有同樣的潛在影響。這么說，我們很難得知這些企業(yè)會如何遵守這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，如果客戶的偏好和政策的目標(biāo)是相悖的話。左下圖讓我們得以一窺歷史數(shù)據(jù)。過去在燃料效率方面的提高都是通過油價大量提升而達(dá)到的，在這個例子里，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和低燃料價格進(jìn)行比較。除此之外，現(xiàn)有的CAFE標(biāo)準(zhǔn)需要一個更為持續(xù)以及快速升級的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這和我們在過去35年里見到的都截然不同。這一現(xiàn)行的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)似乎是一個非常高的目標(biāo)（如果目標(biāo)定的太高，接下來的反饋肯定會發(fā)生變化）。
But Rising Vehicle Penetration in Emerging Markets Is Exerting Upward Pressure on Demand.
然而新興市場的車輛普及率正在上升。
Increasing demand for vehicles from emerging market consumers is likely to somewhat offset the downward pressure from rising efficiency standards. Most of the demand growth within the transportation sector is likely to come from EM economies, such as China and India, which are seeing growing middle classes. In particular, these countries are expected to see a rapid increase in vehicle penetration off of very low levels. The charts below illustrate this dynamic for cars, though it is equally valid for light trucks and heavy vehicles as well.
新興市場消費(fèi)者對于汽車的持續(xù)增長的需求將進(jìn)一步?jīng)_銷來自汽車燃料效率更嚴(yán)苛的行業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的壓力，絕大部分來自于需求的增長，來自于新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體在運(yùn)輸板塊上持續(xù)攀升的需求，比如說，中國和印度，我們可以看到強(qiáng)勁增長中的中產(chǎn)階級。尤其是這些國家將被指望一個迅速的，在汽車普及率的增長。下圖展示了汽車的變量，盡管這同樣適用于輕卡車以及重型運(yùn)輸工具。
5
And the Impact from Fuel Switching Will Be Limited in the Next Few Years
來自石油的沖擊將在接下來幾年受到限制
Disruptive technologies like electric- and natural gas-powered vehicles have the potential to displace a significant amount of oil demand in the longer term, but current economics are unfavorable and logistical bottlenecks stand in the way of near-term mass adoption. For electric vehicles, the necessary battery technology to incentivize mass adoption is likely at least a few years away. Additionally, the lag between investment in battery factories and production is sufficiently long (and the current investment level is sufficiently low) to make expectations of mass adoption within the next five years impractical, barring a technological breakthrough in the production process. In the case of natural gas vehicles, high upfront costs (which are only slowly improving), infrastructure bottlenecks (e.g., fueling stations), and the current limited availability of natural gas/LNG shipping in many regions present major near-term roadblocks.
（對石油行業(yè)）具有破壞性的科技，例如電力以及天然氣混合驅(qū)動的運(yùn)輸工具有潛力在長期替代石油的位置。然而當(dāng)今的經(jīng)濟(jì)并不適合大量采用并普及類似技術(shù)。對于電動車來說，其必須的電池科技，要達(dá)到大量普及的水平，需要好幾年的時間。進(jìn)一步說，來自電池工廠的電池的投資以及產(chǎn)量之間的滯差非常巨大。（現(xiàn)在的投資水平非常的低）要在接下來的五年使得（電動車）的大規(guī)模普及變得不切實際，那就要阻攔在此領(lǐng)域的巨大成就。在天然氣運(yùn)輸工具里案例中，其前置成本高（這些車型技術(shù)升級緩慢）同時伴隨著基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的固有瓶頸（建立天然氣供應(yīng)站）同時這些運(yùn)輸工具無法在眾多區(qū)域中使用。
For example, the charts below show a range of possible paths for electric vehicle demand—in even the most bullish scenarios, only 0.2-0.3 mb/d of oil are expected to be displaced over the next five years.
舉例來說，下圖展示了一系列可能的，電動車需求的可能路徑，即使在最好的情況里，只有20萬~30萬桶石油/日的耗油會在接下來5年內(nèi)被取代。
Inventories Are Helping to Bridge the Gap, but Limited Cheap Storage Capacity May Be a Downward Pressure on Prices in the Near Term.
石油存貨在幫助填補(bǔ)這中間的空缺，然而僅有的便宜的石油可用儲量有可能在不久的未來成為石油價格的潛在壓力。
Oil supply can be met by demand or stored as inventory. The price of oil will reflect how these net out. Inventories today are helping to smooth an oversupplied market, as they move supply from today into the future. For this mechanism to work, market participants have to be willing and able to buy oil today and pay the costs associated with storing it, because they can sell at a future date for a price where they make a profit. Over the past year and a half, the steep oil futures curve has incentivized a rapid build in oil inventories.
石油供應(yīng)可以滿足需求或儲存為庫存，石油的價格會反映最終的凈收益。當(dāng)（石油生產(chǎn)商）將今日的供應(yīng)轉(zhuǎn)移到未來，今日的庫存將使這個已經(jīng)供應(yīng)過剩的市場得以更好的運(yùn)作。為了讓這樣的機(jī)制不同運(yùn)作，市場的參與者必須主動并且想要在今天購買原油并且支付其中的儲存成本，因為他們能在未來以一個能盈利的價格出售。在過去的一年半里，陡峭的石油期貨曲線促使石油庫存大量增加。
Reported OECD inventories are at record highs, and US commercial storage (especially Cushing) is operating at close to 90% utilization rates. While it’s difficult to know precisely how close we are to actual capacity limits, there is a risk that this storage capacity fills and oil has to be increasingly stored in more expensive offshore tankers or even shut in, which would be a downward pressure on oil prices and likely require even lower prices than are discounted for the upcoming year .
公布的OECD石油庫存達(dá)到了紀(jì)錄新高，美國商業(yè)石油儲存（尤其是庫欣）在接近90%的利用率下運(yùn)作。雖然很難準(zhǔn)確地知道我們與實際能力有多接近，總有個風(fēng)險是石油庫存的容量到達(dá)極限，石油庫存逐漸被儲藏至更為昂貴的境外水箱甚至是到必須銷毀庫存的階段，而這將成為石油價格的下行壓力，在未來幾年，而最終需要更低的石油價格已完成復(fù)蘇。
庫欣是全球交易量最大的原油期貨美國WTI原油期貨的主要交割地，每周平均有超過30億桶WTI原油期貨合約在此地進(jìn)行交割。庫欣擁有世界最多的儲油罐，儲存容量達(dá)7300萬桶，相當(dāng)于全美總存儲量的13%左右。美國幾條重要的輸油管道在此地匯聚。
Barring a Significant Price Increase, Oil Markets Will Likely Shift to Undersupply by 2017.
通過阻止石油價格的增長，石油市場將可能在2017年轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣┎粦?yīng)求。
Overall, unless prices change, we expect the oil glut to lead to a major shortage starting at some point in 2017. The following chart shows what we expect for oil supply and demand, given the prices prevailing in forward markets. If the price move to change the investment comes too late, the price moves could be large and disruptive.
總體來說，除非原油價格發(fā)生改變，我們預(yù)期石油的過剩將導(dǎo)致2017年某一階段出現(xiàn)主要的石油短缺，下圖顯示了我們將從是有的供應(yīng)和需求里可預(yù)期的變化,尤其在現(xiàn)價普遍超過遠(yuǎn)期價格的市場里。如果石油價格遲遲不動，那么投資就來不及了，最終石油價格可能以更劇烈，更具破壞性的方式運(yùn)動。
6
Appendix: A Brief History of Oil Investment Cycles
附錄： 一個原油投資周期的簡要?dú)v史
Below, we walk through some historical examples of oil cycles to show how oil investment cycles have played out over time, in order to provide some perspective on the current cycle and what we might see going forward. Each cycle brought online new sources of production and diversified where the world got its oil from.
為了針對現(xiàn)在的周期以及不久的未來提供部分見解，以下我們將簡述幾個歷史原油周期的實例以展示長期來說原油投資周期是如何運(yùn)作的。每個周期都會為產(chǎn)能帶來新資源同時將持續(xù)分散化世界原油的供應(yīng)來源。
There have been four major investment cycles in the oil market, where high prices have incentivized investment that eventually unlocked new sources of supply. Indeed, in the same way that high oil prices have unlocked unconventional oil sources in the most recent boom, crude oil production was initially developed as an alternative lighting fuel to whale oil, the dominant source of the day, whose price escalated as the result of decades of overfishing. Each oil boom brought on new supply to the market, either from the discovery of new fields or from tapping known fields that previously weren’t economically or technologically feasible.
在原油市場中有四個主要的投資周期，當(dāng)高昂的石油價格被投資熱潮所催生出來，這將形成新的供應(yīng)。確實，這和高昂的石油價格以及石油投資熱潮中，高油價總是催使非傳統(tǒng)的，更便宜的石油資源被開采出來一致，而石油當(dāng)初是為了代替鯨油而成為照明燃料的，最終成為了今天統(tǒng)治一切的能源。而鯨油的價格也隨著逐漸的過度撈捕而水漲船高。每一個石油的繁榮都會促使新的石油供應(yīng)被引入到市場中，不論是對新領(lǐng)域的勘探或是開發(fā)先前被認(rèn)為沒有太多增長空間或是可被開發(fā)的油田。
? The first real investment cycle in oil occurred in the 1910s, as the automobile age ushered in a new source of demand for oil. The surge in demand was dramatic—US motor vehicle registrations rose from 0.1 vehicles per 1,000 residents in 1900 to 87 by 1920—and oil prices rose with it, doubling in real terms over the course of the decade. This dynamic incentivized a wave of investment that unlocked new fields in Texas, Oklahoma, California, and Louisiana. All this supply came online at the same time that the Great Depression was hitting demand, and prices fell by more than 70% in the early 1930s.
第一個真實的原油投資周期在1910年開始，當(dāng)汽車時代催促著石油的需求。這樣需求的增長是巨大的，美國的汽車等級從1900年的每1000名公民中有0.1輛汽車到1920年的87名-同時石油的價格也在不斷增長，在這段時期增長了近2倍，而隨之而來的就是投資的熱潮以及德克薩斯，俄克拉何馬州，加利佛尼亞和路易斯安那油田的開采，所有的這些供應(yīng)開始同時上線，之后美國經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條開始重創(chuàng)需求，在1930年早期，石油價格跌超70%。
? Demand growth from WWII, in combination with the discovery of the massive East Texas oilfield (the largest in the US), kicked off an investment boom that lasted decades. During and after WWII, the price of oil was largely government regulated, which limited the degree of overheating and overinvestment. Starting in WWII, this boom saw the development of new sources of production in the emerging world, in particular the USSR and the Mideast. During this time, the US share of global production halved, as supply came online from these new regions. This supply built over time and, in combination with a slowdown in demand growth resulting from the US recession in the early 1960s, pushed the market into surplus. While the US, led by Texas, moderated production in order to sustain flat nominal pricing, the real price of oil declined by a third in the 1960s.
自世界第二次世界大戰(zhàn)的需求增長后，同時結(jié)合發(fā)現(xiàn)大規(guī)模的東德克薩斯油田（美國最大的油田）這直接引爆了石油投資的狂熱。在世界二次大戰(zhàn)期間以及二戰(zhàn)之后，原油的價格在很大程度上是被政府所主導(dǎo)的，這防止了投資過熱和過度投資。在二戰(zhàn)開始是，這樣的繁榮緊隨著發(fā)展中國家發(fā)現(xiàn)了新資源而來，尤其是蘇聯(lián)和中東，在這一階段，美國在全球石油的生產(chǎn)量的占比縮減為二分之一，而來自新地區(qū)的供應(yīng)源源不斷。這樣的供應(yīng)開始建立，同時伴隨著全球需求增長的放緩，最終導(dǎo)致了1960年初美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，而這使得美國產(chǎn)生貿(mào)易順差。當(dāng)美國，被德克薩斯州所引導(dǎo)的，穩(wěn)定的石油供應(yīng)以圖穩(wěn)定石油的價格，真實的油價在1960年減少了近3分之一。
? The OPEC price shocks (in ’72 and ’79), coupled with a flood of liquidity in the wake of the Bretton Woods breakup, led to a boom in investment in novel resources in Alaska, Russia, Latin America, and the North Sea. However, demand waned in the face of skyrocketing prices, and the market had to work through significant oversupply, with prices falling by 50%. Higher-cost producers cut investment spending in the face of compressed margins and deteriorating balance sheets, and credit problems emerged in Latin America, where governments had not only pushed to invest in new sources of oil but had taken on foreign borrowing to finance this investment.
OPEC 產(chǎn)石油價格飆升（1972年以及1979年）是布雷頓森林體系瓦解后，大量流動性緊隨著的市場產(chǎn)物。這也同時帶來了來自阿拉斯加，俄羅斯，拉丁美洲以及北海的新資源。無論如何，伴隨著原油如同火箭一般的價格飆升，需求開始衰退，而原油企業(yè)必須通過降價50%以在這樣顯著的供應(yīng)過剩市場中生存，更高成本的生產(chǎn)商在通過在投資支出的大幅削減以應(yīng)對安全邊際的擠壓以及資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的惡化。拉丁美洲出現(xiàn)信貸問題，最終導(dǎo)致拉美政府只能通過借入大量外債以融資推進(jìn)開采新的石油渠道。
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